A Myerson Value for Multi-choice Games with a Communication Network

David Lowing, Satoshi Nakada, Serge Bertrand Nlend Oum and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Satoshi Nakada: Tokyo University of Science [Tokyo]
Serge Bertrand Nlend Oum: UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies cooperative games where agents have multiple participation levels, and are embedded in a communication network. We introduce a solution concept that generalizes the Myerson value. It is constructed through a restriction operator that captures the interaction between the network structure and agents' participation levels, and the way this interaction constrains feasible coalitions. The solution is axiomatically characterized and shown to satisfy a stability property. To demonstrate its applicability, we extend the classical sequencing problem to a setting where agents can exert effort to reduce processing times. Our solution then determines how the resulting cost savings are distributed when agents exert maximal effort and tasks are ordered in a cost-minimizing sequence.

Keywords: Multi-choice games; Communication networks; Axiomatic characterization; Stability; Sequencing problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05354219v1
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