Selecting equilibria in single peaked, single crossing sender-receiver cheap talk games with finitely many types

Stéphan Sémirat ()
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Stéphan Sémirat: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes

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Abstract: I study perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in single peaked, single crossing, sender-receiver games with finitely many types for the sender. I introduce a refinement that restricts off-path beliefs to sets of types ultimately identified by a non-deterministic truth-imitating process. Accordingly, a candidate equilibrium fails to satisfy a No Incentive To Truth Imitate (NITTI) criterion if at least one type has a strict incentive to deviate by initially pretending to be truthful but ultimately being identified through the process. NITTI selects a unique PBE outcome.

Keywords: Cheap talk game; Refinement; Neologism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11
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