Collusion through Common Leadership

Alejandro Herrera Caicedo, Jessica Jeffers and Elena Prager
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Jessica Jeffers: HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies whether common leadership, defined as two firms sharing executives or board directors, contributes to collusion. Using an explicit measure of labor market collusion from unsealed court evidence, we find that the probability of collusion between two firms increases by 12 percentage points after the onset of common leadership, compared to a baseline rate of 1.2 percent in the absence of common leaders. These results are not driven by closeness of product or labor market competition. Our findings are consistent with the increasing attention toward common leadership under Clayton Act Section 8.

Date: 2025-06-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05384748

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5278295

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