Comments on Competition Policy and Labour Markets

Marcel Boyer
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Marcel Boyer: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: Traditionally, labour concerns have not been top-of-mind when considering competition policy, but the current approach to wage-fixing, anti-poaching, and anti-mobility agreements between firms has been one of the main reasons behind recent Parliamentary attention to competition policy and labour markets. Key stakeholders in academic and policy circles have called for more robust enforcement regarding monopsony / oligopsony power in labour markets, when assessing mergers and acquisitions for example, as well as regarding market power in labour representation (unions) and certification as entry barriers in labour markets. The objective here is to identify the numerous challenges and pitfalls in assessing the level of competition on labour markets, both supply and demand, and in addressing remedies if necessary.

Date: 2026-02-02
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