Seller-Side Tying of Platform Services

Alexandre De Cornière, Kinshuk Jerath and Greg Taylor
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Alexandre De Cornière: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Kinshuk Jerath: Columbia University [New York]
Greg Taylor: University of Oxford

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Abstract: This paper analyzes seller-side tying on digital platforms, where access to a core intermediation service is conditioned on sellers using an ancillary service (e.g., fulfillment or payments). We model a monopoly platform matching consumers and competing sellers across many product categories, with consumers valuing the ancillary service heterogeneously. When adoption is voluntary, sellers under adopt because asymmetric adoption creates vertical differentiation that softens price competition, raising prices and reducing platform participation. Tying restores high adoption, intensifies competition, and increases consumer surplus. A ban on tying or structural separation lowers adoption and can harm consumers.

Date: 2026-04-10
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