Quasi-Leontief utility functions on partially ordered sets II: Nash equilibria

Walter Briec, Qibin Liang and Charles Horvath
Additional contact information
Walter Briec: UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions $u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$ has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the characterization of efficient Nash equilibria mainly follows from the analysis carried out in part I. When the payoff functions are individually quasi-Leontief functions the matter is somewhat more complicated. We assume that all the strategy spaces are compact topological semilattices, and under appropriate continuity conditions on the payoff functions, we show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibria using the Eilenberg-Montgomery Fixed Point Theorem for acyclic valued upper semicontinuous maps defined on an absolute retract and some non trivial properties of topological semilattices. The map in question is defined on the set of Nash equilibria and its fixed points are exactly the efficient Nash equilibria.

Date: 2026-05-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05623732

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().