La concurrence fiscale: principaux enseignements de l’analyse économique

Sébastien Raspiller
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Sébastien Raspiller: INSEE - Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)

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Abstract: The issue of tax competition and its regulation has been the subject of extensive debate and analysis within various international bodies. It is of particular importance to France, whose standing in the realm of tax competition is often considered poor. The first part of this text examines the insights offered by theoretical literature. It turns out that this literature does not provide a clear-cut verdict on the need to regulate tax competition. There are two reasons for this. One is the use of models that remain relatively rudimentary. The other is a fundamental issue: opposing conclusions can be reached depending on how one views state behavior. Tax competition is detrimental if it limits the ability of "benevolent" states to levy the taxes necessary for their normal development. Conversely, that same tax competition can be seen as an indirect way to curb the tendency of "Leviathan" states to over-expand. This theoretical impasse has not prevented the development of more pragmatic approaches, which are examined in the second part of this text. Three possible levels of regulation can be identified. Initially, the European Union and the OECD sought to distinguish between "harmful" competition—which should be avoided—and so-called "legitimate" competition. In practice, this distinction remains limited in scope, as the criteria adopted identify only the most extreme cases of harmful competition. A second form of regulation aims not to curb tax competition, but to ensure it takes place under the clearest possible conditions. The primary tool for achieving this transparency is the harmonization of tax bases. A third level involves the additional question of coordinating tax rates. In this context, the relevant objective is not necessarily to set a uniform rate, but rather a minimum rate. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that countries do not all face tax competition on an equal footing. This heterogeneity can therefore result in a certain dispersion of rates.

Keywords: tax competition; harmful practices; harmonization of tax bases and tax rates; concurrence fiscale; pratiques dommageables; harmonisation des assiettes et des taux d'imposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
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