The design of electricity markets: an economic analysis

Analyse économique de l’organisation du marché de l’électricité

Stefan Ambec (), Claude Crampes () and Jean Tirole
Additional contact information
Stefan Ambec: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Claude Crampes: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Jean Tirole: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Fighting against global warming requires electrifying energy uses and giving up on carbon-based power. Consequently, the organization of electricity production and transmission must not only promote short-term efficiency in dispatch, but also send out reliable signals to guide investment by producers and consumers; and this under normal macroeconomic conditions as well as in the face of unforeseen events, such as Covid 19 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. To meet these challenges, the European authorities and the EU member states are negotiating the introduction of long-term physical and financial contracts that will complement wholesale electricity markets. This note compares the costs and benefits of these contracts and emphasizes the assignment of risks among stakeholders.

Date: 2026-08-18
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05719648v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05719648v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05719648

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().