Coalitional Stability in a Class of Social Interactions Games

Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber
Additional contact information
Hideo Konishi: BC - Boston College
Michel Le Breton: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Shlomo Weber: SMU - Southern Methodist University [Dallas, TX, USA]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, we define additive dyadic social interactions games (ADG), in which each player cares not only about the selected action, but also about interactions with other players, especially those who choose the same action. This class of games includes alliance formation games, network games, and discrete choice problems with network externalities. While it is known that games in the ADG class admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is a maximizer of the game ís potential, the potential approach does not always apply if all coalitional deviations are allowed. In this paper, we systematically identify both restrictions on possible coalitional deviations to preserve the potential function and types of equilibria that ensures their existence for various subclasses of ADG or its subclasses, extending the approach taken by Le Breton et al. (2021). An additional avenue of our results is the examination of games with outside option which expand the set of alternatives. Although this modification complicates the analysis significantly, positive results are obtained with different class of restrictions.

Date: 2026-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05744241v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05744241v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05744241

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().