A De Facto Referendum: How Proxy Advisors Set Their Standards Through Director Election

Hong Cai, Xucheng Shi and Han Wu
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Hong Cai: EDC - EDC Paris Business School
Xucheng Shi: ESSEC Business School
Han Wu: HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study the standard-setting role of proxy advisors when their preferences diverge from regulatory mandates and shareholders' choices. The say-on-pay (SOP) regulation in 2011 allowed U.S. firms to adopt non-annual voting schedules, whereas proxy advisors strongly preferred annual voting. We show that they leverage negative recommendations in compensation committee member elections (CMEs) as an alternative channel for expressing compensation-related concerns in non-SOP years. Among firms that hold triennial SOP votes, negative recommendations in CMEs are significantly more frequent during non-SOP years. Moreover, proxy advisors promote their standards even more strongly in firms where their preferences are less aligned with the voting choices of shareholders, highlighting their standard-setting role even when unpopular.

Keywords: Executive Compensation; Director Elections; Say-On-Pay; Proxy Advisors; Corporate Governance; Regulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-18
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05759229

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.7458180

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