Voting over tax. What about scoring rules?

Jérôme Serais ()
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Jérôme Serais: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper deals with the democratic choice of tax when voters use scoring rules instead of majority rule . We know since Plott , that a Condorect winner may not exist with majority rule and a multi dimensional set of choice. In order to circumvent this problem, De Donder proposed to use several equilibrium concept of voting games (based on pairwise comparisons) in a context of purely redistributive taxation. Following this way, we have a look at another solution concept, and more precisely scoring rules.

Keywords: Scoring rules; Plurality; Negative Plurality; Borda Count; Taxation choice.; Taxation choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-14
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