Strategic candidacy domain for Scoring rules and Condorcet Consistency

Jérôme Serais ()
Additional contact information
Jérôme Serais: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Strategic candidacy consists for candidates to run or not in an election in order to change the final outcome. Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton proved that when choosing a unique candidate all voting rule are sensitive to strategic candidates. In this paper, we consider scoring rules and show that this manipulation is related to Condorcet efficiency.

Keywords: Strategic candidacy; cycle; Condorcet consistency; IAC; Strategic candidacy; cycle; Condorcet consistency; IAC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05760119v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05760119v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05760119

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().