Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption

Georgy Lukyanov and Mikhail Zolotarev
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Georgy Lukyanov: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Mikhail Zolotarev: HSE - Vysšaja škola èkonomiki = National Research University Higher School of Economics [Moscow]

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Abstract: Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices. An adopter may have favourable private information, or may have received a rebate. We study a government that randomly assigns eligibility for a fixed rebate and chooses the program's coverage and reporting rule. We characterize when disclosing individual eligibility changes optimal coverage from zero to a positive rate under general convex program costs. This requires both a favourable marginal return to a disclosed program and a bound on the direct benefit available from a large opaque intervention. In the benchmark, disclosure allows the government to increase early adoption and welfare while leaving expected total adoption unchanged. We then allow imperfect compliance and private information for the late user. An eligibility label can be strictly informative without changing anyone's decision, in which case disclosure has no welfare value. The policy reversal survives when both extensions are present. The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program.

Keywords: social learning; adoption rebates; policy disclosure; early adoption; public program design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
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