Le problème d'agence dans la délégation de gestion de portefeuille: une revue de la littérature

Raphaëlle Bellando

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Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on the agency problem in portfolio management delegation. The fact that there is no optimal contract in this case is well-documented. More recent papers have shown that this problem can be solved by adding to the contract some management constraints. However some empirical studies about implicit incentives demonstrate the convexity of the manager's compensation, due to an asymmetric relation between flow of funds and the past performances of the fund. Finally, we review empirical work about two important consequences of this agency problem: excessive risk taking and herding.

Keywords: Gestion de portefeuille; problème d'agence; fonds de placements mutuels; portfolio management; agency problem; mutual funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00009383
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Working Paper: Les problèmes d'agence dans la délégation de gestion de portefeuille: une revue de la littérature (2006)
Working Paper: Le problème d'agence dans la délégation de gestion de portefeuille: une revue de la littérature (2006)
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