Sharing the cost of a public good under nonnegativity constraints

Marc Fleurbaey and Yves Sprumont ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from the others.

Keywords: social ordering; public good; maximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-20
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