Opportunist politicians and the evolution ofelectoral competition

Jean-François Laslier and Bilge Ozturck
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Bilge Ozturck: Department of Economics - GSU - Galatasaray University

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Abstract: We study a unidimensional model of spatial competition between two parties with two types of politicians. The office oriented politicians, referred to as "opportunist" politicians, care only about the spoils of the office. The policy oriented politicians, referred to as "militant" politicians have ideological preferences on the policy space. In this framework, we compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils of office are split among the two parties proportionally to their share of the vote.We study the existence of short term political equilibria and then, within an evolutionary setup, the dynamics and stability of policies and of party membership decisions.

Keywords: Political competition. Opportunism. Downs.; Political competition. Opportunism. Downs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-21
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Related works:
Journal Article: Opportunist politicians and the evolution of electoral competition (2016)
Working Paper: Opportunist politicians and the evolution of electoral competition (2016)
Working Paper: Opportunist politicians and the evolution of electoral competition (2016)
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