Job search with ubiquity and the wage distribution

Bruno Decreuse and André Zylberberg ()
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André Zylberberg: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogenous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job-seekers, while homogenous unemployed workers invest in costly search. The key innovation relates to the organisation of the search market and the search behaviour of the job-seekers. The search market is segmented by wage level, and unlike the rest of the literature individuals are ubiquitous in the sense they can choose the amount of search effort spent on each (sub-)market. We show that there exists a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution. Remarkably, the density of this wage distribution is hump-shaped, and it can be right-skewed. Our results are illustrated by an example originating a Beta wage distribution.

Keywords: Search effort; Segmented markets; Monopsony; Wage dispersion; "Search effort"; "Segmented markets"; "Monopsony"; "Wage dispersion" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Job search with ubiquity and the wage distribution (2007)
Working Paper: Job search with ubiquity and the wage distribution (2007)
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