Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis
Alejandro Caparros and
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Alejandro Caparros: IPP - Institute for Public Goods and Policies - CSIC - Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [Spain]
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This paper studies the concept of "mutual aid" developed by Kropotkin, which implies cooperation as a strategic choice. We study this concept in a Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma in a non-cooperative framework and in an indirect evolution framework (with complete and incomplete information). We systematically compare this game with one that models Kant's moral. In the non-cooperative framework both moral concepts imply multiple equilibria. In the indirect evolution framework with complete information Kropotkin's moral concept leadsto generalized cooperation, while Kant's rules lead towards general defection. In the indirect evolution framework with incomplete information both moral approaches favor selfishness. However, if some agents have an imperfect detection technology cooperative behavior will not disappear in Kropotkin's case, while it will vanish with Kant's morality.
Keywords: Kant; mutual aid; non-cooperative game theory; indirect evolution; Kropotkin; Kant. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Mutual Aid: an indirect Evolution Analysis (2010)
Working Paper: Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00275386
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