Do French student really bid sincerely?

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stephane Luchini (), Robert-Vincent Joule () and Jason Shogren
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Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Robert-Vincent Joule: LPS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - AMU - Aix Marseille Université

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Abstract: Do French Students really bid sincerely in real and hypothetical incentive compatible auctions? Recent evidence suggests they do, which goes counter to most observed bidding behavior in theUnited States, and supports the idea that cultural differences may explain bidding behavior more than economic circumstances. Herein we run a robustness check by exploring bidding behavior in classic Vickrey auction for real and hypothetical values in the two largest cities (Paris and Lyon). Two striking results emerge–(1) French students bid sincerely; and (2) no hypothetical bias exists.

Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00277282v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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