MIGRATORY POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: HOW TO BRING BEST PEOPLE BACK?

Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

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Abstract: This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model withexogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and goodworkers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers.Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to theperfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher theincentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow.

Keywords: Temporary migration; Return migrants; Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium; Signaling model.; Signaling model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00344929
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Related works:
Working Paper: Migratory policy in developing countries: how to bring best people back? (2008)
Working Paper: MIGRATORY POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: HOW TO BRING BEST PEOPLE BACK? (2008)
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