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Congestion in academic journals under an impartial selection process

Damien Besancenot (), Joao Faria and Kim Huynh ()
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Kim Huynh: LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: This paper studies the publishing game played by researchers and editors when the editors adopt an impartial selection process. It analyzes the possibility of congestion in the editorial process and shows that, depending on the nature of the equilibrium, the rise of the rejection costs could be an inappropriate solution to avoid the congestion effect.

Keywords: Publication market; Academic journals; Editors; Congestion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-07
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