Competing Activities in Social Networks

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

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Abstract: A set of agents is organized in a social network, which conveys synergies in two activities. Each agent has one unit of a resource to allocate between two activities. We show that individual choices are shaped by Bonacich centrality measures and an attractiveness multiplier. The latter, combined with the elasticity of Bonacich centrality with respect to the intensity of interaction, drives the sign of the network reaction to a modication of the costs of activities.

Keywords: Elasticity of Bonacich Centrality; Social Network; Limited Resource; Competing Activities; Attractiveness Multiplier; Elasticity of Bonacich Centrality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00481460v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing Activities in Social Networks (2014)
Working Paper: Competing Activities in Social Networks (2014)
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