Referenda under Oath

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Alexander James, Stephane Luchini () and Jason Shogren
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Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab.

Keywords: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Hypothetical bias; Oath; Preference revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00490448v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda Under Oath (2017)
Working Paper: Referenda under Oath (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00490448

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