Threshold Value: how binding thresholds affect the outcome of a negotiation

Sylvie Thoron

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to give the prospective outcome or "prospect" of a negotiation when the players' value can only be realized if a certain threshold is reached. Thresholds can be of different forms such as a certain number of players, a certain coalition of players or a certain total level of contribution. A value is proposed, which is defined for a given game and a given threshold. It is derived from a decomposition of the Shapley value.

Keywords: threshold; commitment; Shapley value; coalition structures; weights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-31
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00512774
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Journal Article: Threshold Value: How Binding Thresholds Affect the Outcome of a Negotiation (2011)
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