Gurus and beliefs manipulation

Elyès Jouini () and Clotilde Napp

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We analyze a model with two types of agents: standard agents and gurus, i.e. agents who have the ability to influence the other investors. Gurus announce their beliefs and act accordingly. Each investor has a preferred guru and follows his recommendations. Prices are determined through a classical Walras mechanism. Gurus are strategic: they take into account the impact of their announced beliefs on the other agents, hence on prices. At the Nash equilibrium, this leads to beliefs heterogeneity, to a positive correlation between optimism and risk aversion and to higher risk premia. The impact is stronger on the riskier assets.

Keywords: standard agents; gurus; Walras mechanism; riskier assets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00555609v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Gurus and belief manipulation (2015)
Working Paper: Gurus and belief manipulation (2015)
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