Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi () and Hubert Kempf ()
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Grégoire Rota-Graziosi: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

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Abstract: We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first- or second-mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the strategic complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, both countries may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk-dominance to select the leading government. Lastly, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.

Keywords: public good; Spillovers; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Strategic Complements; Stackelberg; Pareto Dominance; Risk Dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00556944v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective (2011)
Journal Article: Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective (2010)
Working Paper: Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective (2010)
Working Paper: Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective (2010)
Working Paper: Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective (2009)
Working Paper: Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective (2008)
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