Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions

Laurent Lamy

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Brendstrup (2007) and Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006) claim that sequential English auction models with multi-unit demand can be identified from the distribution of the last stage winning price and without any assumption on bidding behavior in the earliest stages. We show that their identification strategy is not correct and that non-identification occurs even if equilibrium behavior is assumed in the earliest stages. For two-stage sequential auctions, an estimation procedure that has an equilibrium foundation and that uses the winning price at both stages is developed and supported by Monte Carlo experiments. Identification under general affiliated multi-unit demand schemes is also investigated.

Keywords: sequential auctions; nonparametric identification; nonparametric estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564887v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564887v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564887

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().