Until Death Do Us Part? The economics of short-term marriage contracts

Stefania Marcassa and Gregory Ponthiere
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Stefania Marcassa: PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: "Until death do us part". Common wisdom considers that marriages will last forever, as the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the prevailing marriage contracts, by exploring the conditions under which short-term contracts would be more desirable. Using a two-period collective household model, we show that, under a large interval of values for household production technology parameters and individual preference parameters, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.

Keywords: marriage contracts; collective household model; length of marriage; household production technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564900v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts (2014)
Working Paper: Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts (2014)
Working Paper: Until Death Do Us Part? The economics of short-term marriage contracts (2010)
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