On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

Andrea Attar and Arnold Chassagnon ()
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Arnold Chassagnon: GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.

Keywords: non-exclusivity; insurance; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00589101v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (2009)
Working Paper: On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (2009)
Working Paper: On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (2009)
Working Paper: On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (2006)
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