The political economy of job protection and income redistribution

Bruno Amable and Donatella Gatti

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Abstract: This paper presents a model allowing to analyze voting, welfare institutions and economic performance. We consider a political economy framework with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, employed workers and unemployed workers. Agents vote on alternative institutional options: the degree of labour market flexibility and the intensity of redistribution. We show that the welfare state configuration depends on the nature of the political system - majoritarian, coalition, twoparty. Because internationalization reduces the possibility for national government to e.ectively tax profits, the existing political coalition is fragilized by the process of globalization. The model generates results concerning the macroeconomic equilibrium employment level. Hence we can assess the effects of internationalization on macroeconomic performance. The impact of internalization depends on the nature of the political system (majoritarian versus coalition government) and on the institutional configuration (positive flexibility versus positive redistribution).

Keywords: job security; redistribution; political equilibriums; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590841v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of job protection and income redistribution (2005)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Job Protection and Income Redistribution (2004)
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