Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks

Muriel Fadairo () and Jianyu Yu ()
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Muriel Fadairo: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper investigates the rationales of exclusive dealing (ED), which is one of the most common forms of vertical restraint and attracts intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. Based on a survey of the theoretical literature, we derive several hypotheses relative to the anti- and pro-competitive motivations of ED. These hypotheses are submitted to French data regarding several types of distribution networks in a wide range of sectors. Considering the industry features, our empirical analysis indicates that in the French distribution system, ED contracts tend to be procompetitive. The evidence suggests that the motivation of ED mainly lies in its positive role to foster the investment of upstream firms.

Keywords: Exclusive dealing; Vertical restraints; Competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur and nep-net
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Working Paper: Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks (2014)
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