Heterogeneous Adjustments in Bank Leverage after Deposit Insurance Adoption
Mathias Lé ()
Working Papers from HAL
This paper empirically investigates the bank leverage adjustments after deposit insurance adoption. Banks are found to increase significantly their leverage after the introduction of deposit insurance. However, the banks' responses appear to be heterogenous. The magnitude of the change in bank leverage decreases with (i) the size, (ii) the systemicity and (iii) the initial capitalisation of banks so that the most systemic and the most highly leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance. As a result, implementing a deposit insurance scheme could have important competitive effects.
Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Bank Risk-Taking; Leverage; Systemic Bank; Capital Buffer; Market Discipline; Too Big to Fail (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-ias
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01074956
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Heterogeneous Adjustments in Bank Leverage after Deposit Insurance Adoption (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01074956
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().