Regulation by contract

Régulation par contrat

Frédéric Marty

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Regulation by contract is often presented as an alternative to an external regulation implemented by an independent sector-specific regulator. The purpose of this short paper is to confront the pros and the cons of each model and to insist on their complementarity.

Keywords: regulation by contract; incomplete contracts; regulation failures; opportunism; régulation par contrat; contrats incomplets; défaillances de la réglementation; opportunisme (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01123533

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