Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff
Damien Bol,
André Blais,
Jean-François Laslier and
Antonin Macé
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Damien Bol: UdeM - Université de Montréal
André Blais: UdeM - Université de Montréal
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Abstract:
We know that electoral systems have an effect on the number of competing candidates. However, a mystery remains concerning the impact of majority runoff. According to theory, the number of competing candidates should be equal (or only marginally larger) under majority runoff than under plurality. However, in real-life elections, this number is much higher under majority runoff. To provide new insights on this puzzle, we report the results of a laboratory experiment where subjects play the role of candidates in plurality and majority runoff elections. We use a candidate-only and sincere-voting model to isolate the effect of the electoral system on the decision of candidates to enter the election. We find very little difference between the two electoral systems. We thus re-affirm the mystery of the number of competing candidates under majority runoff.
Keywords: Electoral; System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff (2016)
Working Paper: Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff (2016)
Working Paper: Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff (2015)
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