Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market

Raïssa-Juvette Samba () and Rhonya Adli
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Raïssa-Juvette Samba: UMNG - Université Marien-Ngouabi [Université de Brazzaville] = Marien Ngouabi University [University of Brazzaville]
Rhonya Adli: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In most societies, the social practice of paying dowry tends to decline and sometimes to disappear. In contrast, a system of marriages negotiated between families continues to exist in India; a marriage squeeze and a real dowry inflation are observed throughout the country. This paper brings a nice application of methods used in the classical matching markets: existence of stable outcomes and a minimum equilibrium dowry, coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes. We further discuss strategic questions and address issues comparative statics when a marriage squeeze yields in the Indian marriage market.

Keywords: Matching; Dowry auction mechanism; Equilibrium stable outcome; Competitive equilibrium outcome; Population increase; Strategy-proof; Comparative statics JEL classification: C78; D78; J11; J12; D10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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