Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting

Antonin Macé ()
Additional contact information
Antonin Macé: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set. I focus on additive rules, which follow the utilitarian paradigm. Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is [0,1].

Keywords: Range Voting; Evaluative Voting; utilitarianism; measurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01222200v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01222200v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01222200

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().