Optimal Taxation Rule Reversal in the Presence of Gentle Polluters and Greedy Cleaners

Damien Sans ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The literature on the micro-economics of the eco-industry often assumed interiority of pollutant net emissions. In a perfectly competitive final good market vertically integrated with an upstream monopoly supply this assumption implies that an optimal tax is always greater than its associated marginal social damage. In this short note we will relax this assumption and challenge that result. The market structure generates a unique threshold on the scale of the marginal social damage, whereby for any value above the threshold an optimal tax is strictly lower and net emissions are zero.

Keywords: microeconomics; eco-industry; imperfect competition; optimal taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pbe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01247190
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01247190/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Taxation Rule Reversal in the Presence of Gentle Polluters and Greedy Cleaners (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01247190

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().