Should dark PoolS be banned from regulated exchangeS?

Nathalie Oriol, Alexandra Rufini () and Dominique Torre ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: European financial markets experiment a strong competition between historical players and new trading platforms, including the controversial dark pools. Our theoretical setting analyzes the interaction between heterogeneous investors and trading services providers in presence of market externalities. We compare different forms of organization of the market, each in presence of an off-exchange and an incumbent facing a two-sided activity (issuers and investors): a consolidated exchange with the incum- bent only, and fragmented exchanges with several platforms, including lit and dark pools, in competition for order ows. By capturing investors from off-exchange, dark trading may enhance market externalities and market stakeholders' welfare.

Keywords: Microstructure; dark pools; Over-The-Counter market; liquidity; market externalities; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mst and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01254447
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Related works:
Working Paper: Should Dark Pools be Banned from Regulated Exchanges? (2015)
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