Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks

Nicolas Houy and Frédéric Jouneau
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Frédéric Jouneau: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we use the axioms introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart (2013) and study their consequences in terms of optimal sets of defaulting firms. We show that, from this point of view, the Absolute Priority axiom is not independent. We also show that the optimal sets of defaulting firms characterized in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) are still optimal when the Limited Payment axiom, implicit in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), is further removed. However, some other optimal sets of defaulting firms appear in this case. Finally, with the help of counterexamples, we show that no further weakening in the set of axioms considered can lead to positive results.

Keywords: Credit Risks; Systemic Risks; Clearing Systems; Financial System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01267340v1
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Working Paper: Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks (2016)
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