Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation

Stéphane Gonzalez () and Aymeric Lardon

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We introduce axiomatically a new solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility inspired by the core. While core solution concepts have investigated the sustainability of cooperation among players, our solution concept, called contraction core, focuses on the deterrence of cooperation. The main interest of the contraction core is to provide a monetary measure of the robustness of cooperation into the grand coalition. We motivate this concept by providing optimal fine imposed by competition authorities for the dismantling of cartels in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the contraction core on the set of balanced cooperative games with transferable utility by four axioms: the two classic axioms of non-emptiness and individual rationality, a superadditivity principle and a new axiom of consistency.

Keywords: TU-game; contraction core; optimal fine; Cournot oligopoly; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01333392v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01333392v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal deterrence of cooperation (2018)
Working Paper: Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation (2018)
Working Paper: Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01333392

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().