Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments

Yukio Koriyama and Ali Ozkes

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: An information aggregation problem of the Condorcet Jury Theorem is considered with cognitive hierarchy models in which players would best respond holding heterogeneous beliefs on cognitive level of the other players. Whether the players are aware of the presence of opponents at their own cognitive level turns out to be a key factor for asymptotic properties of the deviation from the Nash behavior, and thence for asymptotic efficiency of the group decision. Our laboratory experiments provide evidence for the self-awareness condition. We obtain an analytical result showing that the difference from the standard cognitive hierarchy models arises when the best-reply functions are asymptotically expanding.

Keywords: collective decision-making; bounded rationality; cognitive hierarchy; Condorcet Jury Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01485748v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy (2020)
Working Paper: Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy in Collective Decisions (2018)
Working Paper: Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy in Collective Decisions (2018)
Working Paper: Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments (2017)
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