Le prix des services juridiques: entre défaillance de la réglementation et défaillance de marché ?

Frédéric Marty

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The structural reforms undertaken in the field the law profession are underpinned by an industrial organization based logic. The former regulatory framework wasn't, according to this view, exclusively grounded on a public interest logic, but it was captured by the professional themselves in order to be protected against any competitive threat. Such a phenomenon induces excessive prices. This contribution aims at highlighting this debate and at assessing the possibility to implement a competition based governance model in this field, by taking into account the specificities of the services in terms of quality and induced external effects.

Keywords: economics of conventions; regulated professions; law services; regulatory capture; excessive prices; professions réglementées; activités juridiques; prix excessifs; capture de la réglementation; économie des conventions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-20
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Related works:
Working Paper: Le prix des services juridiques entre défaillance de la réglementation et défaillance de marché ? (2018)
Journal Article: Le prix des services juridiques entre défaillance de la réglementation et défaillance de marché ? (2017)
Working Paper: Le prix des services juridiques: entre défaillance de la réglementation et défaillance de marché ? (2017)
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