Port state control inspections in the European Union: Do inspector's number and background matter?
Armando Graziano,
Pierre Cariou (),
François-Charles Wolff,
Maximo Mejia and
Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs
Additional contact information
Armando Graziano: World Maritime University - Malmö Högskola = Malmö University
Pierre Cariou: Kedge Business School [Talence]
Maximo Mejia: World Maritime University - Malmö Högskola = Malmö University
Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs: World Maritime University - World Maritime University
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background influence inspection outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector's backgrounds.
Keywords: Port state control; inspection outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-30
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01649418
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01649418
DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2017.11.031
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