Physicians' Incentives to Adopt Personalized Medicine: Experimental Evidence

David Bardey, Samuel Kembou Nzalé and Bruno Ventelou
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Samuel Kembou Nzalé: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study physicians' incentives to use personalized medicine techniques, replicating the physician's trade-offs under the option of personalized medicine information. In a laboratory experiment where prospective physicians play a dual-agent real-effort game, we vary both the information structure (free access versus paid access to personalized medicine information) and the payment scheme (pay-for-performance (P4P), capitation (CAP) and fee-for-service (FFS)) by applying a within-subject design. Our results are threefold. i) Compared to FFS and CAP, the P4P payment scheme strongly impacts the decision to adopt personalized medicine. ii) Although expected to dominate the other schemes, P4P is not always efficient in transforming free access to personalized medicine into higher quality patient care. iii) When it has to be paid for, personalized medicine is positively associated with quality, suggesting that subjects tend to make better use of information that comes at a cost. We conclude that this last result can be considered a "commitment device". However, quantification of our results suggests that the positive impact of the commitment device observed is not strong enough to justify generalizing paid access to personalized medicine.

Keywords: personalized medicine; fee-for-service; capitation; pay-for-performance; physician altruism; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
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Related works:
Journal Article: Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalised medicine: Experimental evidence (2021)
Working Paper: Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalised medicine: Experimental evidence (2021)
Working Paper: Physicians’ Incentives to Adopt Personalized Medicine: Experimental Evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalized medicine: experimental evidence (2018)
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