Les marchés bifaces saisis par le droit de la concurrence Réflexions sur la décision Android de la Commission européenne

Frédéric Marty and Julien Pillot ()
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Julien Pillot: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: This work aims at analysing the EU Commission's decision Google Android of 18 July 2018. Rather than focusing on the deterring effect of the fine, we question both the underlying damage theory and the potential effects of associated remedies, especially with regard to Android's two-sided structure. Not only is this structure the keystone of Google's business model, but also that of Android's very technical architecture. Such a market structure induces specificities in terms of value creation and stakeholders' interdependence which urges to consider Google's practices (anti-fragmentation provisions and apps' pre-installation) under these two dimensions.

Keywords: anticompetitive foreclosure; mobile operating systems; two-sided markets; exclusionary abuses; tying; marchés biface; abus d’éviction; ventes liées; verrouillage anticoncurrentiel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-09
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Working Paper: Les marchés bifaces saisis par le droit de la concurrence. Réflexions sur la décision Android de la Commission Européenne (2019)
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