French GPs’ Willingness to Delegate Tasks: May Financial Incentives Balance Risk Aversion?

Simon Combes (), Alain Paraponaris and Yann Videau ()

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Abstract: Delegating tasks to paramedics is a fairly recent development in France. So far it has essentially been developed in hospitals and is incipient in general practice. This paper focuses on the willingness of general practitioner to do so. A 2012 survey of 2,000 GPs might help anticipate GPs' willingness to delegate. This paper tests whether a more favourable funding system might help increase GP willingness. We implement a quasi-experimental design wherein GPs are randomly selected to form three groups of equal size, each of them being exposed to a different funding scheme when declaring their willingness to delegate tasks to nurses: Fully Funded (FF) by the social security administration, self-funded by GPs' revenues (Self-Funded, SF) and half-funded by both the social security administration and GPs (Half-Funded, HF). GPs' likelihood to favour task delegation is estimated with a probit model that especially considers a GP's attitude towards risk (aversion or tolerance) among a set of covariates, such as age, gender, rural/urban area, GP density and funding scheme. This article shows that, first, GPs are more likely to favour delegation, when they share a lower proportion of the cost. Second, the effect of risk aversion on the likelihood of favouring delegation is not altered by the funding scheme.

Keywords: Risk aversion; Skill mix; Task shifting; Financial incentives; France; GPs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02071522v1
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Working Paper: French GPs’ Willingness to Delegate Tasks: May Financial Incentives Balance Risk Aversion? (2019)
Working Paper: French GPs’ willingness to delegate tasks: may financial incentives balance risk aversion? (2019)
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