Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization

Emilie Dargaud () and Armel Jacques
Additional contact information
Emilie Dargaud: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.

Keywords: antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02613352v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02613352v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02613352

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().