Universalization and altruism

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: To any normal form game, we associate the symmetric two-stage game in which, in a first stage, the roles to be played in the base game are randomly assigned. We show that any equilibrium of the κ-universalization of this extended game is an equilibrium of the base game played by altruistic players ("ex ante Homo Moralis is altruistic"), and that the converse is false. The paper presents the implications of this remark for the philosophical nature of ethical behavior (Kantianism behind the veil of ignorance implies but is stronger than altruism) and for its evolutionary foundations.

Keywords: Ethics; Games; Evolution; Altruism; Universalization; Kant; Homo Moralis ethics; Homo Moralis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hme
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03227354v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Universalization and altruism (2023)
Working Paper: Universalization and altruism (2023)
Working Paper: Universalization and altruism (2023)
Working Paper: Universalization and altruism (2021)
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