The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly
Gerard Mondello and
Evens Salies
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge.
Keywords: Tort Law; Strict Liability; Negligence Rule; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly; Cournot Competition JEL Classification: D43; L13; L52; K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-gth, nep-his and nep-ind
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly (2018)
Working Paper: The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly (2018)
Working Paper: The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly (2018)
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