Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable

Geir Asheim, Kohei Kamaga and Stéphane Zuber

Working Papers from HAL

Keywords: climate change; efficiency; intergenerational equity; population ethics; infinite streams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03760333v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03760333v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable (2022)
Working Paper: Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03760333

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().